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A godly law? Bulstrode Whitelocke, puritanism, and the common law in seventeenth 
century England 
Jacqueline Rose 
Debates surrounding both the Church and the law played an important role in the conflicts that 
marked seventeenth-century England.  Calls for reform of the law in the Civil Wars and Interregnum 
complicated the apparent relationship between puritanism and the common law, as the first 
fragmented and the second came under attack in the 1640s and 1650s.  This article first analyses the 
common lawyer Bulstrode Whitelocke’s historical and constitutional writings that defended the 
common law against demands for its reform and argued that its legitimacy derived from its origins in 
and resemblances to the law of Moses.  Refraining from the radical application of this model 
employed by some contemporaries, Whitelocke instead turned to British history to make his 
case.  This article then examines Whitelocke’s views of the relationship between common law and 
ecclesiastical jurisdiction in his own day, showing how, both as a lawyer and as a puritan, he 
navigated laws demanding religious conformity.  Whitelocke’s career therefore demonstrates how 
lawyers could negotiate the fraught relationship between the church and the law in the aftermath of 
the reconfigurations provoked by the Civil Wars and Restoration. 
 
This article explores the relationship between puritanism and the common law in mid-
seventeenth century England, as both were re-forged in the crucible of the Civil Wars.  In that 
conflict, puritanism fragmented into its competing elements of godly discipline and 
individual spirituality, as institutional and theological norms broke down.  This political and 
religious chaos also disrupted the common law, which came under attack from various 
demands for reform ranging from procedural improvement to claims that it was an instrument 
of oppression to demands that it be reduced to the law of God.1  In this period, old 
assumptions about the superiority of the common law had to be re-examined and newly 
defended.  The arguments that resulted prompt a reconsideration of the relationship between 
puritanism and the common law.  The predominant stress in previous accounts of this 
relationship has been on how they were associated (or at least allied) against claims to 
authority made by monarchs and the Church of England in the late sixteenth and early 
seventeenth centuries.  An older whiggish approach would interpret such behaviour as a 
search for religious and political liberty, fought along the twin fronts of ‘puritanism’ against 
‘Anglicanism’ and ‘constitutionalism’ against ‘absolutism’.  While these simplistic binary 
divisions have been removed, the emphasis on puritan-common law associations survives.  In 
challenging the jurisdictional claims of High Commission and its ex officio process, 
aggressively using prohibitions to restrict ecclesiastical courts, and claiming that praemunire 
could apply to courts within England, men like James Morice, Robert Beale, Nicholas Fuller, 
and Edward Bagshaw represented the partnership of godly religion and common law 
practice.2 
                                                          
Versions of this article were presented to both the EHS Summer Conference in Cambridge and the Comparative 
Legal History workshop at St Andrews in 2018.  Quotations in it from the Whitelocke Papers at Longleat House 
are included by permission of the Marquess of Bath, Longleat House, Warminster, Wiltshire. 
1 For surveys see Donald Veall, The Popular Movement for Law Reform, 1640–1660 (Oxford, 1970); Blair 
Worden, The Rump Parliament, 1648–1653 (Cambridge, 1974), ch. 6, and below, n. 13. 
2 For a nuanced account of Elizabethan and early Stuart lawyers and ecclesiastical law see Christopher W. 
Brooks, Law, Politics and Society in Early Modern England (Cambridge, 2008), ch. 5; see also Ethan Shagan, 
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 Yet, as Christopher Brooks has noted, ‘while the history of English law had come to 
be inscribed in parallel with the history of the English church’, there were many different 
ways to represent and interpret the details of their relationship.3  This article explores how 
one puritan common lawyer, Bulstrode Whitelocke, envisaged that relationship in a career 
that spanned the period from the 1620s to the 1670s; that is, one that saw the breakdown and 
reconstitution of both puritanism and the common law.  Whitelocke provides an excellent 
case study of a legal practitioner who also wrote about law, history, and the constitution, who 
was concerned about the relationship between temporal and ecclesiastical jurisdiction, and 
whose own puritanism was multifaceted.  This article will explore how he sought out 
‘resemblances’ to the common law in the ancient British past and sacred history in order to 
affirm its status and how he, compared to others, dealt with its perceived relationship to the 
law of Moses, setting this in the context of his spiritual commitments.  In so doing, it both 
encourages reflection on the ways in which periods of crisis may provoke new ways of 
thinking about religion, law, and the relationship between them, and highlights how the same 
examples of this relationship could be deployed in radical or moderate ways, depending on 
the legal, religious, and historical preconceptions and circumstances of the person using 
them. 
 Until 1640 Whitelocke’s legal career took a standard path.  In the 1620s, he followed 
some of the judges on circuit, and ‘took notes of the most remarkeable things and passages’.  
Even at this stage his wide-ranging interests were as much chorographical as legal – holy 
wells jostle assizes.4  He wrote reports on the prerogative court of Star Chamber in the 1630s, 
and his account of his experience in putting cases in the vacations of the Inns included ‘the 
imitation of Starrechamber proceedings’.  As Whitelocke’s career developed, so too did his 
legal knowledge broaden: to the law of JPs and forest law.5  A moderate Parliamentarian and 
peace negotiator in the 1640s, Whitelocke’s legal skills remained in demand.  He chaired the 
committee on the impeachment of Charles I’s leading minister, the Earl of Strafford.  He 
drafted the bill against dissolving parliament without its own consent and gave legal counsel; 
he drafted ordinances (laws passed by parliament’s authority without the royal assent).  
Nonetheless, he saw his promotion to be one of the commissioners of Parliament’s seal in 
1648 as ‘as badde newes as ever came’ and skilfully sidestepped involvement in drawing up 
the articles of treason against Charles I.6  After the regicide, Whitelocke was appointed one of 
the three Commissioners of the Great Seal, who acted as the judges in the Court of Chancery.  
He avoided exemption from the Act of Indemnity at the Restoration, but failed to regain a 
position.  Instead he turned to writing, composing (inter alia) an account of the writ of 
                                                          
‘The English Inquisition: Constitutional Conflict and Ecclesiastical Law in the 1590s’, Historical Journal, 47 
(2004), 541-65; John Guy, ‘The “Imperial Crown” and the Liberty of the Subject: The English Constitution 
from Magna Carta to the Bill of Rights’, in Bonnelyn Young Kunze and Dwight D. Brautigam, eds., Court, 
Country and Culture (Rochester, NY, 1992).  For older views relating to Weberian or Marxian frameworks see 
David Little, Religion, Order, and Law: A Study in Pre-Revolutionary England (Oxford, 1970); Christopher 
Hill, Society and Puritanism in Pre-Revolutionary England (Harmondsworth, 1964). 
3 Brooks, Law, Politics and Society, p. 123. 
4 The Diary of Bulstrode Whitelocke, 1605–1675, ed. Ruth Spalding (Oxford, 1990) (henceforth, Diary), 56, 51.  
On this, see Blair Worden, ‘The ‘Diary’ of Bulstrode Whitelocke’, EHR, 108 (1993), 122–34 and Jonathan 
Fitzgibbons, ‘Rethinking the English Revolution of 1649’, Historical Journal, 60 (2017), 889-914. 
5 Diary, 58, 70, 98; BL, Add. MS 37343, fol. 131r. 
6 Diary, 207. 
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summons to parliament, a history of Britain, and that favoured genre of failed politicians: his 
memoirs.7 
 
I: Godly law 
 
A new godly republic provided both motivation and opportunity for a new godly common 
law.  Those who sought such an object might think they had a prominent contemporary 
example of a legal system directly employing a scriptural model: the Massachusetts law code 
of 1648.  ‘About nine years since’, this explains, ‘wee used the help of some of the Elders of 
our Churches to compose a modell of the Iudiciall lawes of Moses with such other cases as 
might be referred to them.’8  Even this, however, was not a pure application of a Biblical 
code.  The following guide, arranged alphabetically, with internal cross-referencing, focused 
on legislation from the 1640s.  Only one section, on capital crimes, cited the Bible in support 
of the death penalty for idolatry, witchcraft, blasphemy, murder, rebellion, and being a 
rebellious son.9  The mixture of case and statute law with a cluster of biblical authorities in 
this document both drew on and contrasted with John Cotton’s Abstract of the law, dubbed 
by one contemporary ‘Moses his Judicials’, arranged thematically, which only ever cited the 
Bible.10  Still, as Bernard Capp has shown, Fifth Monarchists and other radicals turned to the 
colony for detailed accounts of how to implement the judicial law of the Old Testament in 
their own day.  To at least one member of the Barebones parliament of 1653, the lay preacher 
Samuel Highland, Massachusetts provided the model for a new law based on that of God.11 
Such hopes never came to fruition in England, despite the chances for law reform that 
had seemingly existed after the regicide and the establishment of England’s new republican 
government.  Some contemporaries saw Whitelocke as a potential sponsor of reform.  Peter 
Ball wrote to him in December 1649, enclosing proposals for ‘remagnifying the Law, & 
rendering it perfectly intelligible to the professors and acceptable to the people’.  Ball 
planned to maintain the substance of the law, but to translate it into English and organize it 
into ‘one … scientificall method’ of definitions, divisions, principles, and exceptions, 
combine it into one volume, and fund a public reader of the resulting ‘Pandected’ law.  He 
saw Whitelocke as the man who could make this vision reality.12  Whitelocke sat on the 
committee that appointed the Hale commission to reform the law, and was jointly responsible 
                                                          
7 For his biography see Ruth Spalding, The Improbable Puritan: A Life of Bulstrode Whitelocke, 1605–1675 
(London, 1975).  This says little about Whitelocke’s Restoration career and ideas, for which see my forthcoming 
article: ‘Bulstrode Whitelocke and the Limits of Puritan Politics in Restoration England’, in Justin Champion et 
al., eds., Politics, Religion, and Ideas in Seventeenth- and Eighteenth-Century Britain (Woodbridge, 2019). 
8 The Book of the General Lauues and Libertyes concerning the Inhabitants of the Massachusets [sic] 
(Cambridge, MA, 1648), sig. A2r. 
9 Book of the General Lauues; George Lee Haskins, Law and Authority in Early Massachusetts (New York, 
1960). 
10 [John Cotton], An Abstract of the Lawes of New England (London, 1641); for the title, see Haskins, Law and 
Authority, 124. 
11 Austin Woolrych, Commonwealth to Protectorate (Oxford, 1982), 271–3; Bernard Capp, The Fifth Monarchy 
Men (London, 1972), ch. 7, esp. 164, 170–1; William Aspinwall, The Legislative Power (London, 1656), 30–1; 
Hugh Peters, Good Work for a Good Magistrate (London, 1651), 32. 
12 Longleat House, Whitelocke Papers, vol. 10, fol. 80r; Wilfred Prest, ‘Law Reform and Legal Education in 
Interregnum England’, Historical Research, 75 (2002), 112–22. 
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for receiving the commission’s recommendations.13  His papers include a copy of a letter 
nominating commissioners, previously cited for its suggestion of moderate rather than radical 
reformers,14 but noteworthy too for its proposing certain nominees on the basis of their 
knowledge of other legal systems.  As late as April 1654 there were complaints about the lack 
of Whitelocke’s presence (he was on an embassy to Sweden) when chancery reform was 
mooted.15  Yet when this was proposed in April 1655 Whitelocke refused to implement it and 
was dismissed as Lord Commissioner, although he did not totally lose Cromwell’s favour.16 
Donald Veall argues that Whitelocke was the one person who might have reformed 
the law, and it was decisive that he did nothing.17  Why not?  Even if J. G. A. Pocock’s 
claims about a parochially insular common law mind have been challenged, many common 
lawyers, supporters of a mixed polity and a significant role for parliament in the seventeenth 
century, used the history of the ‘ancient constitution’ to back up their claims, albeit their 
arguments about Anglo-Saxon parliaments and the inclusion of the commons therein, and the 
lack of fundamental change in 1066, were of dubious historical accuracy, as contemporary 
royalists and tories increasingly pointed out.18  Whitelocke did discuss medieval history and 
was concerned about possible points of discontinuity in the common law.  But he also saw, 
and employed, many ‘usable pasts’, not least early British and sacred history, in defending 
the common law.  His claims about England’s legal and constitutional ‘resemblances’ to 
ancient Israel included an emphasis on one particular historical moment: when the early 
British king Lucius had taken the law from the Old and New Testaments.  For Whitelocke, 
however, taking a law ‘out of Moses’ Law’ was something done a millennium before, not 
something to start again from scratch.  Analysis of his arguments underlines the religious 
dimensions of historical cases for the legitimacy and superiority of the common law.  The 
crucial question was not whether to have a godly law or not, but whether one already existed 
or needed constructing.  
At times, Whitelocke offered the sort of defences of the common law that might be 
expected, especially regarding 1066.  In November 1649 he told the House of Commons that 
the multiplicity of suits and consequent delays were due to England’s flourishing trade, not to 
the law itself.19  A year later, he temperately endorsed the idea that law French (and court 
hand) be abolished, as he thought this would do no harm, but he argued against the idea that it 
was a relic of Norman tyranny.  William I had vanquished Harold, but never conquered 
England, being admitted on condition that he maintain the laws.  Here Whitelocke made a 
                                                          
13 On the Hale commission see Mary Cotterell, ‘Interregnum Law Reform: The Hale Commission of 1652’, 
EHR, 83 (1968), 689–704; Alan Cromartie, Sir Matthew Hale, 1609–1676: Law, Religion, and Natural 
Philosophy (Cambridge, 1995), ch. 4; and items in n. 1 above. 
14 Worden, Rump Parliament, 272, see also 111 on Ball. 
15 Longleat House, Whitelocke Papers, vol. 10, fols 159r–160r, vol. 15, fol. 138v. 
16 For his representation of this episode see Bulstrode Whitelocke, Memorials of the English Affairs (1682), 606; 
Stuart E. Prall, ‘Chancery Reform and the Puritan Revolution’, American Journal of Legal History, 6 (1962), 
28–44. 
17 Veall, Popular Movement, 122–3. 
18 J. G. A. Pocock, The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law … A Reissue with a Retrospect (Cambridge, 
1987); Janelle Greenberg, ‘The Confessor’s Laws and the Radical Face of the Ancient Constitution’, EHR, 104 
(1989), 611–37; Brooks, Law, Politics and Society, 83–7, 121–3; Paul Christianson, ‘Young John Selden and 
the Ancient Constitution, c. 1610–1618’, Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, 128: 4 (1984), 
271–315; Mark Goldie, ‘The Ancient Constitution and the Languages of Political Thought’, Historical Journal, 
62 (2019), 1-32. 
19 Whitelocke, Memorials, 415–17; BL, Add. MS 37345, fol. 24r–v. 
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classic case for common law continuity: ‘our laws appear in many particulars to have bin the 
same before the Norman invasion, as they are att this day’.20  He made the same point a 
decade later, in the Notes on the writ of summons to parliament that he dedicated to the 
restored monarch Charles II.  Here he argued that William had called a body of 
representatives from each county to show him what the English customs were and that 
English laws had been applied to Normandy, not vice versa.  For Whitelocke, the Normans 
were just one of many examples of how a change in governors might have altered or added a 
few things, but left the body of the law intact.  ‘[The] antient home borne native lawes … 
[are] the same that they were att the first being of any commonweale in this island, and … 
little or nothing altered by the incursions of conquerors.’  Even the Saxons – those heroes of 
freeborn, pre-Norman-yoke law to some Civil War radicals21 – had not introduced the law, 
for they were uncivilized pagans, and the common law was for civilized Christians.  The 
merchenlage and westsaxonlage were, Whitelocke claimed, older British laws, deriving from 
the second century, when ‘Lucius the first brittish king’ founded the laws ‘upon the holy 
scriptures, divers of them continuing to this day’.  These Britons ultimately came ‘from 
Japhet and his posterity’, giving the seventeenth-century common law the status of the least 
changed and most original law there was.22 
 In defending the common law, Whitelocke had a favoured strategy and favoured 
word: ‘Resemblances’.  These resemblances pointed back to the pre-Saxon era and to the 
religious underpinning of the common law.  In his Notes uppon the King’s Writ Whitelocke 
compared the division between unwritten common law and statute to the position of the 
Israelites before and after the Ten Commandments.  He thought there were ‘some 
resemblances’ between the judges pronouncing common law and Moses giving judgement, 
although he said these had been inherited elsewhere too, for example among the Swedes and 
the Goths.  The word is found again in his two-volume history of Britain from Brutus to the 
end of Roman government: at the end of the first volume, in chapter 81, resemblances to 
British government; and in chapter 29 of volume 2 (resemblances to Jewish laws and 
government), in which Whitelocke worked through the bible, book by book, finding 
similarities.  Chapter 78 explored resemblances to British manners, chapter 79 those to 
Roman government, though in fact Whitelocke firmly rejected any idea that English law 
derived from Roman law.  While admitting that the names of legal entities derived from 
Latin, he gave a number of reasons why Roman law would not have been imposed: it was not 
Roman policy to do this (even when, eventually, Britain was made a province, because it was 
too uncivilized to bother doing so), Roman law was not settled at the time the Romans 
governed Britain, and no trace of it seemed to be extant.  Citing the fifteenth-century 
common lawyer Sir John Fortescue, Whitelocke firmly associated Roman law with absolute 
and arbitrary government, and so deemed it ill suited to the English ‘mixed, not absolute, 
government’.  Common law was ‘much more free’, much more appropriate.23  Quoting John 
Selden (perhaps the most historically sophisticated early Stuart lawyer), Whitelocke insisted 
that ‘all laws in generall are originally equally ancient’ as they all derived from natural law; 
                                                          
20 BL, Add. MS 37343, fol. 236v. 
21 Most famously described in Christopher Hill, ‘The Norman Yoke’, in J. Saville, ed., Democracy and the 
Labour Movement (London, 1954). 
22 Whitelockes Notes uppon the Kings Writt for choosing Members of Parlement, ed. Charles Morton, 2 vols 
(London, 1768; henceforth, Writ), 1. 408, 424, 427–8, 430–1. 
23 Writ, 1. 412; BL, Add. MS 37342, fol. 151r–v. 
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in England, the common law came from King Lucius and the scriptures, and its model was 
not the law of Rome but that of Moses.24 
It was not unusual to deny the influence of Roman law on England.  But it is 
intriguing that Whitelocke buttressed this position by twisting an example usually cited to 
show the English Church’s autonomy into one deployed to defend legal autochthony.  King 
Lucius was a figure whom sixteenth-century Protestants frequently referenced.  According to 
them, when he converted to Christianity he had asked the Bishop of Rome, Eleutherius, for 
guidance.  Eleutherius had supposedly replied that papal authority was not necessary, for 
‘you be God’s vicar in your kingdom’; a brilliant, if historically dubious, early endorsement 
of royal ecclesiastical supremacy.  As Felicity Heal has shown, Lucius was an extremely 
pliable figure in the sixteenth century, cited by Catholics as well as Protestants.25  Yet the role 
that Lucius could play in legal arguments has been less often noticed.  Whitelocke’s account 
brings it to the fore, as when he argued: 
[that] the Roman laws were not then in use here, appears by the letter sent from the 
king, to Eleutherius Bishop of Rome desiring to have the Roman lawes, sent into 
Britaine, that the people might be governed by them … by the Answear of 
Eleutherius, the Roman & civil laws wee may alwayes reject, out of the Testaments 
by the Councell of your Realme, take a law, &c. … Lucius & his State, did 
accordingly consulte & consider to supply and take lawes out of Moses’ lawe for it is 
very apparent (as may be more particularly showed elsewhere) that many of our 
positive & written lawes are grounded upon Moses lawe, & at this time was the most 
generall & certaine ground layd both of our positive & written lawes that continue 
yet26 
Here, godly monarchy was used to demonstrate how neither canon nor civil law was 
admissible if it ran against the common law, though these might be useful (Whitelocke said, 
vaguely) if the municipal law failed.  The manuscript in which this account was given formed 
the opening to Whitelocke’s quasi-autobiographical, quasi-historical ‘Annales’.  In the 
preface to them, dated July 1664, Whitelocke told his intended audience, his children, that he 
had included ‘some (though weake) vindications, of the antiquity, iustice, and honour of the 
English lawes, & people Custumes & gouernment’.  To say that laws and rights were 
introduced by heathens and conquerors was a great blot on them; despite some alterations and 
additions, they were still very near the laws of the Hebrews.27 
 For Whitelocke, attention to early British history and the Old Testament served to 
legitimise more than revolutionise common law.  His position on the constitution was similar.  
Although he rejected absolute monarchy as illegitimate on the basis of 1 Samuel 8, this was a 
far cry from the exclusivist republican claim that all kingship was illegitimate because 
                                                          
24 Writ, 1. 430, 413; BL, Add. MS 37342, fol. 152r, ch. 28.  Selden’s comment comes on page 17 of his Notes 
on Fortescue’s De laudibus legem Angliae (London, 1616). 
25 Felicity Heal, ‘What can King Lucius do for you? The Reformation and the Early British Church’, EHR, 120 
(2005), 593-614, qu. 598. 
26 BL, Add. MS 37342, ch. 79, fols 149v, 151v–152v.  Brooks, Law, Politics and Society, p. 107, notes that 
Beale and Morice cited Lucius when arguing about ex officio jurisdiction and incorporated consultation with 
lawyers into the narrative. 
27 BL, Add. MS 4992, fols 5r, 7r. 
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idolatrous.28  In arguing that the three estates of the realm were king, lords, and commons (a 
contentious position associated with Civil War Parliamentarianism, for it reduced the king to 
an estate and omitted the bishops) he drew on a range of comparisons, and again cited the 
Hebrew constitution as the crucial explanatory model: ‘This mixture of three estates, in 
supreame councells, we find amongst the Hebrewes, and most other nations in imitation of 
them.’29  That King Lucius and his public council had taken the laws of the kingdom from the 
Old and New Testaments30 was, for Whitelocke, the exemplification of how to blend the 
ancient constitution, British history, and scriptural models.  It also meant that radical 
reconstitution of the common law was unnecessary: it was, at root, a godly law already. 
 
II: Common law, ecclesiastical jurisdiction, and the prosecution of nonconformity 
 
What did this vague origin in sacred history mean, in Whitelocke’s eyes, for the relationship 
between common law and ecclesiastical law?  This was particularly contentious in the period 
both in theory and in practice, given its implications for the prosecution of Protestant 
nonconformity.  Whitelocke emphasised how important it was ‘that the true religion 
established may be mainteyned’ when giving a charge to the grand jury of Abingdon in the 
1630s. This duty, their ‘speciall care’ would involve enforcing sober morality, detecting 
Jesuits, and seeking out ‘conceited Sectaries’.31  But Whitelocke himself might have felt 
some sympathy towards the last group, as he refused to enforce statutes governing conformity 
to the Church of England in 1634.  According to the modern edition of his Diary, when 
summoned to the privy council to explain himself, he told the Earl of Holland, the high 
steward of Abingdon, that ‘he might have bin censured to incroach uppon the jurisdiction & 
rights of the Church, if as a Justice of peace he should have taken cognisance of them’.  Yet 
this tones down the more expansive manuscript, which includes him being accused of 
complying with (as well as countenancing) the puritans, and explains that he ‘knew no 
common Lawe, nor Statute, in force, for the punishment of them, especially by Justices of the 
peace, & that the complainers did not preferre any Indictment against them. & privately, I 
acknowledged … that I was not convinced of their crimes’.32 
Respect for the boundaries of ecclesiastical jurisdiction (not something for which 
common lawyers were famed) was exposed as a mere excuse when, several months later, 
Whitelocke gave a charge to the Oxford Quarter Sessions on the power of temporal courts in 
ecclesiastical questions ‘& the antiquity thereof’.33  While the text of this charge is not extant, 
his later essays argued that all ecclesiastical jurisdiction derived from monarchs (citing 
Lucius in support) that there had been mixed ecclesiastical/temporal courts before 1066, that 
fathers of families had once exercised ecclesiastical jurisdiction, and that both they and kings 
                                                          
28 Republican exclusivists (like Milton) read rabbinical commentaries on the book of Samuel as suggesting that 
all kingship was idolatrous.  Eric Nelson, The Hebrew Republic (Cambridge, MA, 2010), ch. 1.  For more on 
Whitelocke’s view on this, see my ‘Whitelocke and the Limits of Puritan Politics’. 
29 Writ, 2. 57; Michael Mendle, Dangerous Positions: Mixed Government, the Estates of the Realm, and the 
Making of the Answer to the XIX Propositions (Alabama, 1985). 
30 BL, Add. MS 37342, ch. 31. 
31 Longleat House, Whitelocke Papers, vol. 5, fol. 230v. 
32 Diary, 90–1, 92–3; BL, Add. MS 37343, fols 5r–7r. 
33 BL, Add. MS 37343, fol. 131r. 
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were priests who could and should preach.34  Forms of ecclesiastical usurpation of royal 
authority should be prosecuted, but Dissenters should not be punished.  This radical 
collapsing of the distinction between ecclesiastical and temporal authority would be a fixture 
of Restoration anticlerical writing, occasionally coupled with demands (not spelled out by 
Whitelocke, but a necessary feature of 1650s law reform debates due to the collapse of the 
ecclesiastical courts) for temporal courts to judge marriage and probate.  Such arguments 
were sometimes deployed in church courts seeking to prosecute nonconformity, including 
claims that no ecclesiastical process should be recognized if it did not run in the king’s name 
(as per a defunct statute of the 1540s), that the canons were not valid because not ratified by 
parliament, that the entire Anglican system was therefore guilty of praemunire, and that it 
should be taken over and governed by a lay viceregent.35 
 Most Dissenters probably contented themselves with less explosive (but more 
effective) strategies of finding technical errors in the process summoning them.  Whitelocke 
gave free legal advice to Baptists and ‘fanatics’ (his term), and to the French church in 
London (unspecified, but probably in the wake of demands that it conform to Anglican 
ritual).36  Unfortunately, none of the content of this advice seems to survive, leaving 
historians with just one example of Whitelocke’s argument on a case of religious dissent, and 
that not a typical one.  The case was that of the Quaker James Nayler, tried by parliament in 
1656 for re-enacting, in Bristol, Christ’s entry into Jerusalem.  Whitelocke thought Nayler’s 
views ‘strange’.  He asserted that magistrates and Christians had a duty to ‘bear … testimony 
against these abominable crimes’.  The ‘wicked fellow … deserves all punishment’.  But he 
opposed the death penalty on several grounds.  The commonwealth’s survival was not 
dependent on executing Nayler, so death was not justified under natural law.  By divine law, 
a blasphemer should die.  Here Whitelocke turned to the stoning demanded in Leviticus 
chapter 24, just as Massachusetts did.  Where the colonists cited verses 15 to 16 to insist on 
the death penalty, however, Whitelocke referred instead to verse 12 (‘they put him in ward, 
that the mind of the Lord might be shewed them’) to argue that one should wait on God in a 
doubtful case.  Moreover, this case was doubtful.  Nayler’s behaviour was not heresy 
according to the first four general councils of the church.  What counted as blasphemy under 
human law changed.  In the course of showing this, Whitelocke cited the Bible, Gregory of 
Tours, the royalist John Spelman, the Calvinist political theorist David Paraeus, a case from 
Bordeaux, the 1648 Blasphemy Ordinance, de haeretico comburendo, and the cases of 
Strafford and Laud.  Most importantly, to try Nayler would be to create a retrospective law, a 
dangerous proceeding.  A Catholic government might have punished the Quaker, but that was 
no precedent for Protestants to follow.37 
 Whitelocke’s position on Nayler was somewhat ironic given his later life.  If we turn 
from the legal to the spiritual dimensions of that life, we find evidence of puritanism in 
                                                          
34 Bulstrode Whitelocke, Essays Ecclesiastical and Civil (London, 1706); BL, Add. MS 21099. 
35 Jacqueline Rose, Godly Kingship in Restoration England (Cambridge, 2011), 194–202. 
36 Diary, 743, 753, 754, 832, 682; Larry J. Kreitzer, ‘William Kiffin and the Nonconformist Response to the 
Conventicle Act of 1670’, in Kreitzer, William Kiffin and his World, pt 2 (Oxford, 2012), 169, 173 hints at 
emphasis on procedural errors; for other Dissenters’ strategies, see Craig W. Horle, The Quakers and the 
English Legal System, 1660–1688 (Philadelphia, 1988). 
37 A Complete Collection of State Trials, V (London, 1810), cols 821–8 (Lev. 24: 12 for waiting on God); The 
Diary of Thomas Burton, ed. John Towill Rutt (4 vols, London, 1828), 1. 32, 57–8; cf. The Book of the General 
Lauues, 5. 
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transition from what is sometimes termed church-type to sect-type behaviour: from a national 
reformed church to individual gathered congregations.  Whitelocke exhibited what might be 
deemed some traditional puritan characteristics.  His writings repeatedly praise models of 
sober living, like Job, and condemn drunken excess.  He partly attributed William I’s victory 
in 1066 to Harold’s army spending the night before the battle drinking and debauching rather 
than praying.  He was also a firm believer in providence’s actions in his own life as well as 
on this macrohistorical canvas, filling his diary with accounts of how God blew the tiles off a 
new building when he was grumpy, and eased his bowel movements when godly clergy 
joined him in prayer.38  And, while ill in 1670, he wrote a ‘History of Persecution’, in large 
part an abridgement (albeit running to over 200 double-column folios) of John Foxe’s Acts 
and Monuments.  Deeply indebted to Foxe though this narrative was, it diverged from the 
Tudor martyrologist in its employment of the language of ‘liberty of conscience’ to describe 
the Israelites’ desire to follow their religion in Egypt.  Tellingly, Whitelocke used the term 
used to denote temporary toleration in the Restoration in stating that pharaoh would not grant 
this ‘indulgence’.39   
It may be no coincidence that Whitelocke turned to this specific project months after 
the passage of the viciously intolerant Second Conventicles Act, for he firmly rejected the 
strict uniformity of the Restoration church.  While still attending his parish church, he 
sheltered ejected Presbyterians, met the leading Independent John Owen, and had increasing 
contact with the Quaker William Penn.  He took out a licence under the 1672 Indulgence to 
allow nonconformist meetings at his house and continued to host gatherings of over a 
hundred people even after the Indulgence was withdrawn in 1673.40  Furthermore, 
Whitelocke would himself preach or ‘speak’ to his household with increasing regularity from 
the late 1660s, or have his son read out his sermons if he was ill.41  Here was the changing 
nature of puritanism embodied: while Whitelocke reinscribed Foxe, some of his own sermons 
were posthumously published by Penn.42 
 
III: Conclusion 
 
The crisis of the Civil Wars exposed the tensions within both puritanism and the common 
law, and placed their apparent partnership under severe strain.  Different visions of that 
relationship had existed before, but were now multiplied as a campaign to reform the 
common law sometimes took the form of demands for a new godly law.  Even those puritans 
and Parliamentarians who were willing to work for the new republic, however, could defend 
the common law as sufficiently rooted in godliness already.  This was more than a reflexive 
or insular common law mind.  If Whitelocke’s praise of common law partly constituted a 
predictable pride in its antiquity, it was one framed in historical terms that went beyond pre-
                                                          
38 Writ, 1. 324–8; BL, Add. MS 37342, ch. 69, fols 37v, 9r; BL, Add. MS 37341, fol. 28v; Diary, 762, 804. 
39 Longleat House, Whitelocke Papers, vol. 27, fols 10v, 9r; for more on this work see my ‘Whitelocke and the 
Limits of Puritan Politics’. 
40 The licences were not recalled until 1675.  The legal limit was five attendees from outside the household. 
41 For details see the Restoration years of the Diary and my ‘Whitelocke and the Limits of Puritan Politics’. 
42 Bulstrode Whitelocke, Quench not the Spirit [ed. W. Penn] (London, 1711).  Penn also edited the 1709 edition 
of the Memorials. 
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Norman and Saxon history to the ancient British past and a moderate interpretation of a 
Hebrew model.  The context of the Civil Wars and their aftermath rendered these historical 
bases for the common law particularly contentious.  For Whitelocke, Moses’s law granted 
legitimacy to the seventeenth-century common law, but was not a model by which to replace 
it, just as the Hebrew constitution pointed in the direction of moderate mixed monarchy, not 
of republican exclusivism.   
The plurality of puritanism is now a familiar refrain in early modern historiography.  
Much has been written, too, about common law in the Elizabethan and early Stuart period, 
but its nature and the intellectual milieu of its practitioners during the Civil Wars, 
Interregnum, and Restoration remains relatively uncharted territory.  Educated in the golden 
age of the early Stuart Inns of Court, but practising law and writing its history into the 
Restoration, Whitelocke bridges this division.  His combination of common law practice, 
historical writings, and disgust at religious intolerance suggests a new avenue for exploration: 
how the relationship between religion and the common law developed in the mid-to-late 
seventeenth century, as both lawyers and puritans reconstituted their beliefs in the aftermath 
of the puritan revolution.  From this, we may learn not only about different visions of the 
connections between the church and the law, but also about how an established pattern of 
associations changes into a new relationship between them. 
 
